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FORUM: MASS ATROCITIES AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN
ETHIOPIA
Atrocities in Revolutionary Ethiopia, 1974-79: Towards a
Comparative Analysis
Jacob Wiebel
Department of History, University of Durham, Durham, UK
Introduction
The Ethiopian revolution of 1974 resulted in the establishment of a military regime, the
Derg, that oversaw and orchestrated numerous atrocities during its seventeen years in
power. Some of these were part of the “Red Terror” that violently repressed all urban
opposition, whereas others were associated with counter-insurgency measures against
rural guerrillas. While a new generation of scholars is re-evaluating the history and lega-
cies of the Ethiopian revolution, the period’s atrocities are yet to be adequately examined
in relation to comparative and conceptual discussions on genocides and crimes against
humanity. In pursuit of a greater integration of Ethiopian historiography with the field
of genocide studies, this forum contribution examines three essential conditions and fea-
tures of the Red Terror in critical dialogue with questions, methods, and insights devel-
oped in work on other case studies. It focuses on the dynamics of dehumanization, the
role of a fear-filled “atrocity environment,” and the evolution of new violence-facilitating
organizational structures, arguing the need for a global history as well as for a compara-
tive approach.
Ethiopia’s unprecedented social and political revolution of 1974 promised to dismantle
much of the structural and cultural violence on which the country’s imperial order had
been founded. That the revolutionary process would itself entail significant direct vio-
lence was soon understood, accepted, at times even celebrated by all revolutionary
groups. The result was a network of rebellions, counter-insurgency operations, reigns
of state terror and border wars that over the following seventeen years generated numer-
ous crimes against humanity and cost hundreds of thousands of lives.
The first notable massacre following the revolution occurred on the night of 22 Novem-
ber 1974. Members of the Derg – the fractious and embattled military junta that had
claimed state power just months before – assassinated 59 prominent members of the
imperial family and of the ancièn regime.1 This first high-profile atrocity was a harbinger
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History of the Red Terror: Contexts and Consequences” in The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged,
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of things to come: lethal violence in response to political problems would remain a central
feature of Derg rule until the regime was ousted in 1991. Later massacres carried out in
the name of the revolution, however, tended to target recently formed, Marxist opposi-
tional political groups and their suspected sympathizers rather than members or suppor-
ters of the imperial regime.
Major civil wars raged in the north of the country throughout the post-revolutionary
years, with ultimately successful insurgencies fought by rebels that would dominate
Ethiopia and Eritrea for decades from 1991: the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF) in Tigray and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in Eritrea. But the
Derg was also forced into costly conflicts elsewhere. This included the long insurgency
fought by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the armed confrontation in the
Somali-inhabited Ogaden region, which escalated into a major inter-state war with
Somalia – a major focal point of global attention in the Cold War – in 1977.
For many urban Ethiopians, however, it was through the infamous “Red Terror” propa-
gated by the Derg in the late 1970s that systematic violence became a fact of post-revo-
lutionary life.2 The Red Terror was the military regime’s response to the challenge posed
by revolutionary groups and activists who resisted its control of the state and its claim to
lead the revolution. Such resistance had become increasingly violent: in 1976, the most
popular among the urban opposition groups, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Party (EPRP), started assassinating Derg members and their civilian allies as part of an
urban guerrilla struggle. The Red Terror, which enveloped much of urban Ethiopia
between 1976 and 1978, brought an end to any overt urban opposition activity. This
was achieved through tens of thousands of extrajudicial killings; the use of systematic
torture; and a series of massacres, searches, orchestrated denunciation meetings, and
abductions.3 The repression was most intense and sustained in Addis Ababa,4 but
equally engulfed major cities including Asmara, Gondar, and Dessie, as well as a
number of smaller provincial cities and towns, following its success in the capital by 1978.5
The Red Terror was notable – and brutally effective – due to the forms as well as the scale
of its violence. Its violencewas in turns public and covert, displaying amerciless severitywhile
concealing its true scale. The bodies of the Terror’s targets were frequently left on public
display for days, bearing notices denouncing their “counter-revolutionary” status and
guarded to prevent relatives from retrieving them. Conversely, nightly abductions and disap-
pearances were commonplace, with victims tortured, murdered, and secretly buried in mass
graves.6 Public funerals and visiblemourning for victimsdeemed “reactionaries”wereprohib-
ited.7 Tens of thousands were tortured, often using the infamous technique known asWofe
The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987: A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993), 77.
2 Jacob Wiebel, “The Ethiopian Red Terror,” in The Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of African History (Oxford University
Press, 2017); Zewde, “The History of the Red Terror.”
3 Jacob Wiebel, “‘Let the Red Terror Intensify’: Political Violence, Governance and Society in Urban Ethiopia, 1976-78,”
The International Journal of African Historical Studies 48, no. 1 (2015); Tadesse Simie Metekia, “Violence against and
Using the Dead: Ethiopia’s Dergue Cases,” Human Remains and Violence: An Interdisciplinary Journal 4, no. 1 (2018):
77-80.
4 Wiebel, “Let the Red Terror Intensify.”
5 Mary Dines, “The Ethiopian “Red Terror” in Behind the War in Eritrea, ed. Basil Davidson, Lionel Cliffe, and Bereket Habte
Selassie (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1980).
6 Metekia, “Violence Against and Using the Dead,” 79.
7 Donald R Katz, “Children’s Revolution: A Bloodbath in Ethiopia,” Horn of Africa 1, no. 3 (1978), 5.
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Ilala. This involved the tying together of victims’ hands and feet and their suspension from a
horizontal pole, exposing body parts rich in nerve endings – palms, soles, genitals – for beat-
ings with sticks, “gumare” whips or electric cables.8 Victims’mouths were often stuffed with
rags, only periodically removed to permit confessions that promised to end, pause, or lighten
the pain. Other common experiences of torture included being burned with cigarettes and
(particularly for female detainees) rape and other forms of sexual violence. Information
gleaned from interrogations involving torture was bureaucratically processed to map local
allegiances and to violently dismantle opposition networks.
In concert with the wider web of mass violence and civil war in post-revolutionary
Ethiopia, the Red Terror bequeathed profound and lasting legacies to Ethiopian society
and politics. Beyond its direct social and psychological impacts, state violence was a
major push factor in the formation of the country’s now sizeable permanent diaspora
in North America and Europe.9 Domestically it fed into the evolution of a surveillance
state with local knowledge and coercive capacities that has few parallels anywhere in
Africa.10 Since the Terror largely targeted and eliminated the multi-ethnic groups that
opposed the Derg, it also had the effect of leaving ethno-nationalist insurgencies as
the only viable challenge to the military regime in the country.
As the other articles in this collection make clear, the widespread use of political vio-
lence in revolutionary Ethiopia was not by itself exceptional in the country’s modern
history. From this vantage point, we may question the claim of the prominent Derg
official and defector Dawit Wolde Giorgis that the Red Terror represented “violence
that has no parallel in Ethiopian history.”11 Indeed, the wealth of parallels, however
partial or qualified, clearly play a role in explaining the genesis and continuing signifi-
cance of the revolutionary era’s mass violence. The reign of the Derg regime did,
however, witness notable innovations in the organization, justification, and targets of
mass violence. It also leveraged global contexts in unprecedented ways to fund and facili-
tate its atrocities, as the following pages will demonstrate.
To date, the history of the Red Terror has been tied to the wider literature on mass vio-
lence primarily from two perspectives: on the one hand, there have been studies that com-
pared organized violence in Derg-ruled Ethiopia to that of other “classical” or late twentieth-
century revolutions.12 The most comprehensive among these, a comparison of Ethiopian
and Cambodian experiences by Edward Kissi, has been developed in an earlier issue of
this journal.13 Such studies have examined the relation between revolution and mass vio-
lence, and in Kissi’s monograph queried the applicability of the concept of genocide.14
8 The technique was also used in Brazil, where it was known as the “parrots perch.” Martha K Huggins, Mika Haritos-
Fatouros, and Philip G Zimbardo, Violence Workers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 51. The similarity
in name suggests a connection. For a typical account of the method during the Red Terror, see Taddele Seyoum
Teshale, The Life History of an Ethiopian Refugee (1974-1991): Sojourn in the Fourth World (Lewiston: Edward Millen
Press, 1991), 43.
9 Solomon Addis Getahun, The History of Ethiopian Immigrants in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 1900–2000
(East Lansing: Michigan State University, 2005).
10 Jacob Wiebel and Samuel Andreas Admasie, “Rethinking the Ethiopian Red Terror: Approaches to Political Violence in
Revolutionary Ethiopia,” Journal of African History 60, no. 3 (2019).
11 Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1989).
12 Bahru Zewde, The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, C. 1960–1974 (Oxford: James Currey,
2014); Gebru Tareke, “The Red Terror in Ethiopia: A Historical Aberration,” Journal of Developing Societies 24, no. 2
(2008) Ein Prinz Aus Dem Hause David (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 2011).
13 Edward Kissi, “Rwanda, Ethiopia and Cambodia: Links, Faultlines and Complexities in a Comparative Study of Geno-
cide,” Journal of Genocide Research, 6, no. 1 (2004): 183–206.
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Comparative questions concerning Ethiopia’s revolutionary violence have also been
probed, often by legal scholars, in relation to later transitional justice processes. Here,
too, the question of whether this violence could be labelled as “genocide” has loomed
large, this time in relation to the Red Terror trials led by a Special Prosecutor’s Office
from 1993. Due to the distinct definition of genocide in the Ethiopian penal code of
1957, perpetrators of mass violence and leading figures in the Derg, including its chair-
man Mengistu Haile Mariam, were tried for – and convicted on – charges of genocide.15
This literature has shed light on hitherto under-examined aspects of Ethiopia’s revolution-
ary violence that transpired in the course of the trials. It has also begun to insert the
Ethiopian experience into wider discussions about genocide memory and transitional
justice.16
Valuable as these studies are, their comparative analysis remains circumscribed by their
scope and focus. To broaden the integration of Ethiopian historiography and wider dis-
cussions in the field of genocide studies, this article analyses essential conditions for
the Red Terror and raises questions about its atrocities – including hitherto neglected
ones about the role of sexual violence and the legacies of Ethiopian imperialism – that
arise from the comparative record. It also highlights the need to pay closer attention to
the global history that shaped and energized Ethiopia’s Derg-era atrocities. There is a ten-
dency to explain such violence in endogenous terms, as growing out of histories rooted
solely within Ethiopia.17 This won’t do: violence in revolutionary Ethiopia was deeply
embedded in global relations and exchanges. In fact, as will be argued below, part of
the reason that comparisons to other instances of mass violence in the twentieth
century resonate so strongly is that there were either direct connections or comparable
entanglements in global systems of power and of intellectual and material exchange.
The Politics of Depersonalization
The violence organized by the Derg against its opponents evolved markedly over the first
few years after the revolution. Early massacres, executions and assorted “revolutionary
measures,” such as house searches, arrests, and detentions, elicited lengthy commentary
and official justification. In regime statements and government newspapers, victims were
named, and their alleged crimes were carefully laid out. Following the execution of
twenty-three youths in November 1976, for instance, the government dailies Addis
Zemen and its English-language counterpart The Ethiopian Herald reported on their
front pages that the targets had “belonged to the anarchist group calling itself the Ethio-
pian People’s Revolutionary Party” and assured readers that their case had been
14 Edward Kissi, Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006).
15 Yacob Haile-Mariam, “The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
Ethiopian High Court,” Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 22 (1998): 667–746; Kassahun Molla Yilma,
“The Legal Characterization of Facts During the Red Terror in Ethiopia: Genocide, War Crimes, or Crimes against
Humanity?” International Annals of Criminology 58, no. 2 (2020): 173–92; Kinkino Kia Legide, “The Facets of Transitional
Justice Red Terror Mass Trials of Derg Officials in Post-1991 Ethiopia: Reassessing Its Achievements and Pitfalls,” Journal
of African Conflicts and Peace Studies 4, no. 2 (2021): 1–33; Metekia, “Violence against and Using the Dead.”
16 Esp. Haile-Mariam, “The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation,” See also Bridget Conley, Memory from the Margins: Ethio-
pia’s Red Terror Martyrs Memorial Museum (Cham: Springer, 2019); Elias O. Opongo, “The Red Terror of the Derg Regime:
Memorialization of Mass Killings in Ethiopia,” in Remembrance and Forgiveness: Global and Interdisciplinary Perspectives
on Genocide and Mass Violence, ed. Ajlina Karamehić-Muratović and Laura Kromják (London: Routledge, 2020): 63–72.
17 Compare Sebastian Conrad, What Is Global History? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 88.
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“thoroughly investigated, and various evidences were produced to prove the charges of
murders, robberies, and anti-revolutionary crimes.”18
By the time the radical wing of the Derg around Mengistu Haile Mariam had taken
control of the junta a year later, launching the Red Terror and giving their followers
“netsa ermeja” – carte blanche to carry out extra-judicial violence – such justifications
were no longer given. Killings were carried out covertly at improvised interrogation
sites or overtly on urban streets without being publicized or explained in print media
or on the airwaves. Victims were no longer named. Instead, they were labelled and socially
ostracized. This often occurred literally, through affixed placards denouncing them as
reactionary enemies of the people. Frequently, they were denied medical attention and
funeral rites. The repudiation of their social personhood, in other words, had become a
common feature of the Red Terror.
While dehumanizing language and actions have been documented in a wide range
of genocides, these clearly exist on a broad continuum. At one end of the spectrum are
forms of collective framing through rhetoric and policies that are designed to socially
impede and ostracize the target group. At the other extreme is the biological labelling
of victims as animals, usually vermin, pests, or insects, or as diseases that need to be
eliminated. Across the spectrum, the denial of protection and of citizenship rights
alongside an attack on personal dignity and social ties reduces victims to what
Giorgio Agamben has termed “bare life,” a state of being bereft of a recognized stand-
ing within society.19
The radical othering of victims as an integral mechanism in processes of mass violence
has been widely discussed in the field of genocide studies. The subject was raised inci-
sively in Primo Levi’s post-war reflections on the apparent loss of victims’ humanity as
a quotidian and enabling feature of the Holocaust.20 It was then extensively debated in
response to Hannah Arendt’s arguments concerning the eradication of “human nature
as such” in totalitarian systems.21 For Arendt, the elimination of human individuality, inde-
pendent thought and relational empathy were central goals of totalitarian regimes, and
constituted an essential precondition for the mass violence that they organized.22 Many
scholars have since developed and nuanced this emphasis on the dehumanizing aspects
of genocide. David Blatman contended that “without dehumanization, the [Nazi] mur-
derers could not have committed their crimes.”23 Rowan Savage similarly described dehu-
manization as “a mechanism or strategy that allows genocide to occur.”24
Dehumanization, in his view, functions both as motivation and legitimation for mass vio-
lence, placing victims “outside the bounds of humanity and of humanmoral obligation.”25
Gregory Stanton, the President of Genocide Watch, included dehumanization in his list of
“ten stages of genocide.”26
18 “For Murder, Counter-Revolutionary Crimes: Twenty-Three Anarchists Executed,” Ethiopian Herald, 3 November 1976.
19 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Il Potere Sovrano E La Nuda Vita (Torino: Einaudi, 2005).
20 Primo Levi, Se Questo È Un Uomo (Torino: Einaudi, 1958).
21 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 1951), 459.
22 Johannes Lang, “Explaining Genocide: Hannah Arendt and the Social-Scientific Concept of Dehumanization,” in The
Anthem Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr and Philip Walsh (London: Anthem Press, 2017), 175–96.
23 Daniel Blatman, The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011),
424.
24 Rowan Savage, “Modern Genocidal Dehumanization: A New Model,” Patterns of Prejudice 47, no. 2 (2013): 131–61, 147.
25 Savage, “Modern Genocidal Dehumanization,” 155.
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The universality and necessity of dehumanization has been questioned, however. In
many cases, a weaker sense of depoliticization sufficed. Christopher Browning’s seminal
examination of “ordinary” Nazi perpetrators noted that many among them were pro-
foundly aware of, and indeed frequently struggled with, the fellow humanity of their
victims.27 Studies have shown that aversion to killing fellow human beings at scale
does not always require their prior dehumanization, particularly when the practice has
become normalized.28 Here, Arendt’s assumptions have been widely overhauled, and
may themselves be viewed as preventing analytical empathy with perpetrators. Johannes
Lang has compellingly argued that much genocidal violence is in fact aimed precisely at
extending “the perpetrator’s sense of power over another human being.”29
In revolutionary Ethiopia, violence was predicated on the repudiation of victims’ social
lives and personhood. Biological characterizations and overt dehumanization were rare,
while depersonalization was ubiquitous. Kissi has noted that categories of citizenship
were notably narrowed in the Derg’s 1974 penal code, which defined a “revolutionary
Ethiopian” in terms of loyalty to the regime’s political programme.30 After assuming com-
plete control of the Derg in February 1977, Mengistu reiterated this narrow conception of
citizenship, declaring at a large rally in Addis Ababa that “only those who are opposed to
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism and who are genuine revolutionaries
and patriots, will have a place in socialist Ethiopia.”31 It was widely understood, and soon
amply demonstrated in practice, that these categories were to be interpreted in terms of
unquestioned loyalty to the Derg. Over the following months, dissidents real and ima-
gined were labelled in government media and statements inter alia as “anarchists,”
“counter-revolutionaries,” and “anti-people elements,” terms in a new lexicon of revolu-
tionary Amharic designed to mark them out as politically, and hence socially, deviant.32
The step from the denial of citizenship status to violence-legitimating othering was a
short one.
It was, above all, in particular acts of violence that such depersonalization was most
apparent. Murdered bodies of victims, often disfigured by sustained torture, were
dumped on streets and in public places. The location of such displays was chosen strate-
gically to amplify the Terror. Many were left in places at which the victim was well known:
in front of the family residence, at their workplace, or at bars that they used to frequent.33
Others were unloaded at public sites including markets, bus stations and busy streets,
forcing traffic to weave around them.34 Corpse-watchers were stationed, at times for
26 Gregory H Stanton, “Ten Stages of Genocide” Genocide Watch (1996) https://www.genocidewatch.com/tenstages
(accessed 19 September 2021).
27 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: Har-
perCollins, 2017).
28 Compare Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare (London: Basic
Books, 2000); Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2013).
29 Johannes Lang, “Questioning Dehumanization: Intersubjective Dimensions of Violence in the Nazi Concentration and
Death Camps,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 24, no. 2 (2010): 225–46, 225.
30 Kissi, Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia, 80.
31 “Chairman Addresses Graduates of 30th Batch of Guennet Military School,” Ethiopian Herald, 13 February 1977.
32 Semeneh Ayalew and Binyam Sisay Mendisu, “What Is in a Term? A Historical and Linguistic Examination of the Revo-
lutionary Terminology: Ywdäm, ‘Let It Be Demolished, Down with,’ 1974–1977,” Northeast African Studies 13, no. 1
(2013): 53–70.
33 Metekia, “Violence against and Using the Dead,” 81.
34 See e.g. John Cumbers, Living with the Red Terror: Missionary Experiences in Communist Ethiopia (Charlotte, NC: Morris
Publishers, 1996), 159.
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days, to prevent bodies from being collected and buried and to report on local responses.
The public mourning of those killed in the Red Terror was prohibited. In a number of
instances, bereaved families were forced to sing songs extolling revolutionary violence
in public. Some families were charged for the bullets that had slain their loved ones in
order to have their corpse released.35 Many more never learned of the fate of relatives
who had disappeared upon their arrest or were said to have been moved from their
site of detention. Especially during the closing stages of the Red Terror, and throughout
the 1980s in areas of conflict, disappearances and internment in unmarked mass graves
became commonplace.
The theatrical aspect of much of this violence was intended to strike terror into society,
to weaken the active opposition to the Derg, and thereby to secure the regime’s power. In
a striking illustration of what Achille Mbembe has termed “necropolitics,”36 the Derg
relied on lethal violence to inscribe its claim to sovereignty on the ground and to bring
an end to the contestation of Ethiopia’s revolutionary situation. The regime’s means to
this end were the bodies of its murdered victims. Significantly, these victims had not
been “dehumanized” – the effectiveness of the Terror relied precisely on their very
human exemplification of the cost of non-compliance. Yet they had been systematically
depersonalized, having been denied the relations, rituals and status in society that had
constituted their social personhood. Instead, they had been reduced to political instru-
ments of Derg power. Whether or not such depersonalization was necessary to motivate
or legitimate perpetrators’ violence, it lay at the heart of the Terror’s political message.
Any challenge to the Derg’s sovereignty or claim to lead the revolution would place dis-
sidents outside the social and legitimate political realm and mark them out as “reaction-
ary” targets for revolutionary – and hence “red” – Terror.
Layers of Fear and Agency
The depersonalization of victims in the official rhetoric of the Red Terror relied on their
characterization as a threat to society, to the revolution and to order and progress. Their
elimination was cast as necessary, virtuous even, a matter of revolutionary and nationalist
duty. Thepower of such rhetoric derived from thepervasive climate of fear that defined and
overshadowed social ties and political processes in the years after the revolution.37
Several studies have highlighted how fear can act as a powerful driver of aggression and
of genocidal violence.38 Typically, such fear has a dual orientation. On the onehand, there is
fear of the target group and of the threat it is alleged to pose, extensively emphasized in
official propaganda. On the other hand, perpetrators in diverse contexts have been
shown to act out of a fear of their own peers and of the consequences of non-participation.
In his interviews with Rwandan perpetrators, for instance, Scott Straus found that the
spectre of an RPF victory and the fear of reprisals for refusing to join genocidal militias
were among the most common stated motivations for participation in atrocities.39
35 Wiebel, “Let the Red Terror Intensify,” 23.
36 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40.
37 Compare Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo, Violence Workers, 255.
38 See for example Straus, The Order of Genocide; Lee Ann Fujii, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2011).
39 Straus, The Order of Genocide.
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Derg members and their allies certainly had reason to fear for their power and safety on
the eve of the Red Terror. The regime found itself increasingly on the back foot against a
formidable guerrilla operation in Eritrea. In the Ogaden, it was confronted with the pro-
spect of a large-scale Somali invasion, realized by July 1977. The primarily urban opposi-
tion around the popular EPRP had adopted an urban guerrilla strategy, labelled the “white
terror” by the Derg, that centred on the targeted assassination of regime figures and col-
laborators. By the time Mengistu took control in February 1977, he had survived multiple
attempts on his life. Several prominent government figures had fallen to EPRP bullets. In
the provinces of Tigray, Gondar, Gojjam and Bale, meanwhile, the Derg faced escalating
insurgencies. In René Lefort’s words, “from every direction except Kenya, Addis Ababa
heard the sound of marching soldiers.”40
Surrounded by threats to its control of the state, the Derg also struggled for popular
legitimacy and lacked the organizational capabilities or local intelligence to effectively
dismantle insurgent opposition networks. It was for this reason that the government
relied extensively on the mobilization of local informers and collaborators. It was
through the comprehensive devolution of the state’s means and narratives of violence
that the Red Terror became a bottom-up as much as a top-down phenomenon, commu-
nity violence as well as state violence. Derg supporters within newly formed “urban
dweller associations” (Kebele) were armed and encouraged, not least through compulsory
denunciation and confession meetings, to inform on and eradicate subversive actors
within their neighbourhoods. “Revolution Defence” squads were organized and given
license to carry out violence with impunity and minimal supervision. For a period it
was, as Bahru Zewde memorably remarked, as if the “terror had become democratized.”41
This strategy of devolution to local actors’ accounts for the evolving nature of atrocities in
the Red Terror. During its early stages, violence tended to be either indiscriminate, target-
ing suspects on the basis of rudimentary profiling, or driven by local interests and animos-
ities that often could not be equated with official rationales. It was only during the latter
stages of the Terror, when the opposition ceased to pose a credible threat while fear of
repression encouraged widespread denunciations and defections, that state violence
became more centralized, selective, and effective.42
Fear and mistrust, then, operated within different strata of society to motivate and
legitimate violence. The revolutionary situation had upended old hierarchies and
notions of legitimacy. This allowed for unprecedented political possibilities to be envi-
sioned, but it also encouraged multiple groups to pursue such visions violently. The
result was the emergence of what Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo, in their
study of Brazilian police violence, have called an “atrocity environment”: a sociopolitical
climate of profound fear and insecurity among the public and security operatives, “tied
to an assumption that [the latter] are “at war” against some segment of the population.”43
In such a climate, Derg officials sought to leverage systematic violence and serial atro-
cities to secure their power and safety. Local actors who perpetrated much of the Terror’s
violence in urban neighbourhoods equally tended to do so out of fear: fear of the EPRP’s
40 René Lefort, Ethiopia, an Heretical Revolution? (London: Zed Press, 1983), 192.
41 Zewde, “The History of the Red Terror,” 28.
42 Wiebel, “Let the Red Terror Intensify”; in The Logic of Violence in Civil War, compare Stathis N. Kalyvas (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006), ch. 7.
43 Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo, Violence Workers, xx.
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assassination campaign on the one hand, which tended to be most effective against low-
level government collaborators. But fear also, especially as the Derg tightened its grip on
society, of themselves being suspected of subversion and being targeted. As in numerous
other cases of mass violence, participation in the Red Terror was therefore conditioned by
an economy of fear, which was deeply responsive to the shifting supply of credible threats
or promised protection and to demands for safety and for reliable local information.
New Structures of Violence and the Making of Perpetrators
Many studies have focused on the backgrounds and formation of perpetrators. In seminal
works from Browning’s Ordinary Men to Milgram’s Obedience to Authority, historians and
social psychologists have emphasized that perpetrators of mass violence tend to be the
products of situational social environments, not simply “bad apples” found and used by
brutal regimes.44 Their formation commonly occurs within the context of newly estab-
lished organizational structures, designed to carry out swift and extensive violence
against a target group that is perceived as the cause of a grave threat. They therefore
tend to operate within a climate in which their actions are sanctioned by the state, legiti-
mated a priori, and subject to only minimal supervision or accountability.
Violence, within such organizational contexts, is less a product of individual disposition
than of evolving structures, whether militias, police units or counter-insurgency squads,
and of the operational cultures that spring from them.45 The justification for violence
within these structures widely relies on the interweaving of a national security discourse
with the previously discussed dynamics of a perceived “atrocity environment” and of a
depersonalizing of victims. Perpetrators conditioned within such groups are commonly
trained to view the violence associated with their work as inevitable, even as socially ben-
eficial. They are taught to regard empathy as weakness. And they are induced to associate
brutality with commitment and with group masculinity.46
In the scholarship on revolutionary Ethiopia, such comparative insights are yet to be
fully absorbed. Here, too, perpetrators were formed within the organization structures
that employed them, units that often became the locus of convergence between local
agency and state-mandated policies of violence. Yet the analytical gaze remains directed
elsewhere: either “below,” on the putative social origins of local perpetrators, or “above,”
on the orders and decisions of the upper echelons of the Derg.47 It is often noted, for
instance, that many perpetrators were drawn from “the lower strata of society,” as
Abbink has written in one of the most noteworthy studies of the Red Terror; 48 “la canaille
des bidonvilles,” in Lefort’s more colourful description.49 When a popular memoir spoke of
perpetrators in the Red Terror as “misfits, crazy and mad people” who are present in any
44 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Tavistock, 1974); Browning, Ordinary Men;
Philip G. Zimbardo, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Trans-
formed into Perpetrators” in Crimes of War: Iraq, ed. Richard Falk, Irene Gendzier, and Robert Jay Lifton (New York:
Nation Books, 2006).
45 David M Anderson, “British Abuse and Torture in Kenya’s Counter-Insurgency, 1952–1960,” Small Wars & Insurgencies
23, no. 4–5 (2012).
46 Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo, Violence Workers, 249.
47 E.g. Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987.
48 Jon Abbink, “The Impact of Violence: The Ethiopian ‘Red Terror’ as a Social Phenomenon” in Krieg Und Frieden: Ethno-
logische Perspektiven, ed. Jon Abbink, Peter Bräunlein, and Lauser Andrea (Bremen: Kea Edition, 1995), 136.
49 René Lefort, Ethiopie: La Révolution Herétique (Paris: F. Maspéro, 1981) 279.
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society but whom the revolution had empowered, it is the bluntness rather than the
thrust of the analysis that is exceptional.50 Perpetrators are assumed to be predisposed
to brutality, rather than products of periods and structures of heightened violence.
Here, it is as if Arendt had never written about the “banality of evil,” as if Milgram had
never carried out his experiments, as if Browning’s “ordinary men” had no comparative
lessons of value to teach.
How a broad range of actors became perpetrators in the Red Terror, what organiz-
ational structures and operational cultures conditioned their actions, is yet to be ade-
quately researched. Official records, published memoirs and oral interviews with
survivors all highlight revealing patterns of violence at particular detention sites and
among groups of perpetrators.51 Important aspects of operational cultures within such
groups are evident within all such materials: preferred methods of violence, shared
among and sometimes between units; common strategies for depersonalizing or terror-
izing victims; mechanisms for enforcing or complying with peer pressure; and ways of per-
forming a violent masculinity.
Remarkably, many organizational structures through which the Ethiopian Terror was
implemented were recent creations. These included “Revolution Defence” squads and
“Red Terror committees” in neighbourhoods, at workplaces and in trade unions, as well
as teams of interrogators operating within detention sites that were mushrooming
across urban Ethiopia in this period.52 The established police and security forces also
played a significant role in Ethiopia’s revolutionary violence: soldiers in the regular
Armed Forces led the counter-insurgency efforts in Eritrea and Tigray, supported by
vast conscript peasant militias. They also participated in some atrocities of the Red
Terror, such as the May Day massacres of 1977. Similarly, intelligence officials belonging
to organizations such as the Central Investigation Department led violent interrogations
at major detention sites to which notable suspects were funnelled. Most agents of the Red
Terror, however, operated within new structures that had been established in the years
after the revolution to eradicate anti-Derg activities.
The hub of violence work in this period was the expanding web of improvised deten-
tion and interrogation sites located in residential properties that the government had
recently nationalized.53 These were often staffed by employees of each neighbourhood’s
Kebele association. The Kebele became the most local arms of the Ethiopian state. They
had been founded in 1975 for administrative and mobilization purposes, but rapidly
became enmeshed in security operations. Recruited in the first instance from among
young cadres already employed for administrative duties, members of these new
Kebele interrogation teams and other “revolutionary” units operated outside of the estab-
lished police and security forces, and largely independently from them. It was in these
groups that local administrators and citizens were trained to become violence workers.54
50 Felekech Metaferia Woldehana, Sparkle: The Protegée of Emperor Haile Selassie - My Memories of Ethiopian Girlhood
(Oxford: Trafford Publishing, 2002).
51 See e.g. Special Prosecutor’s Office, ደም ያዘለ ዶሴ [A Dossier Carrying Blood] (Addis Ababa, 2010); Hiwot Teffera, Tower in
the Sky (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2012).
52 “Newsletter from Ethiopia,” Amnesty International, 10 April 1978.
53 Abera Yemane Ab, “The defeat of the Ethiopian revolution and the role of the Soviet Union” in Center for the Study of
the Horn of Africa, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Horn of Africa (Center for the Study of the
Horn of Africa: New York, 1988), 92.
54 Wiebel and Admasie, “Rethinking the Ethiopian Red Terror.”
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Those employed within such structures came under significant pressure from three
directions: firstly, they often found themselves on the front lines of the struggle against
opponents of the Derg, not only as perpetrators of state-sanctioned violence but also
as prime targets of retaliation by EPRP hit squads at the local level. The threat that
they had been hired and trained to eradicate was as much an experiential as an ideologi-
cal one to them. Secondly, violence workers were under clear instructions and constant
pressure from Derg officials to upend opposition activities within their localities and to
produce local intelligence. The similarity in torture methods used across different units
and administrations indicates the centralized training they received, as well as a degree
of regular exchange between them. However, violence workers were also afforded con-
siderable freedom in deciding how to fulfil their mandate, particularly during the early
stages of the Red Terror. Such autonomy generated the third type of pressure, often
the most immediate: the pressure arising from developing operational norms and
social relations within their units. Here, brutality towards victims widely became the cur-
rency for demonstrating loyalty, for displaying revolutionary zeal, and for proving com-
mitment to the group and its cause. As a result, mercilessness was widely rewarded
with in-group trust and even with leadership positions, whereas restraint and expressions
of empathy risked inviting suspicion or even purges. The fact that most of these organiz-
ational structures were new and established specifically to carry out “revolutionary
measures” meant that their practices were less circumscribed by the pre-existing behav-
ioural norms and accountability structures of the regular security services.
Much of the local diversity in the forms and scale of violence – some neighbourhoods
saw intense local reigns of terror while others were largely spared – can be explained by
the varying intensity of such pressures. In localities with a strong opposition presence, the
pressures from “without” and from “above” were most intense, generating a more pro-
nounced institutionalization of violent practices within units. The dual origin of external
pressure also indicates the extent to which such groups operated at the intersection
between the state and society. Embedded in the local communities within which they
worked, it was not uncommon for perpetrators to be familiar with victims’ backgrounds,
networks, and activities. This resulted in local and personal conflicts being widely
absorbed into the dynamics of the Terror.55 It also meant that violence workers, some
of whom had been recruited after themselves being “broken” under torture, were in a
unique position to gather, extract, or act on local intelligence.
In the course of the Terror, the activities of local groups were increasingly centralized,
and their autonomy was gradually restricted.56 Reforms to the Derg’s intelligence appar-
atus allowed intelligence gathered by local units to be centrally processed, combining
with improved surveillance capacities to effectively dismantle the EPRP and other opposi-
tional organizations. Many of these reforms were achieved in close collaboration between
the Derg government and its socialist bloc allies.57 Such alliances alert us to the impor-
tance of understanding violence in revolutionary Ethiopia not only in relation to the coun-
try’s internal political history, but also against the background of an influential global
history.
55 Wiebel, “Let the Red Terror Intensify.”
56 Radoslav A Yordanov, The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa During the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism
(Lexington Books, 2016); Wiebel and Admasie, “Rethinking the Ethiopian Red Terror.”
57 Wiebel and Admasie, “Rethinking the Ethiopian Red Terror,” 473.
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Revolutionary Violence and Global History
If our discussion thus far has suggested a need to “zoom in” in order to understand the
causes and mechanisms of mass violence in revolutionary Ethiopia, then we must equally
insist on a parallel “zooming out.” That is, wemust adopt an analytical scale that transcends
national frames. There is no doubt that systematic atrocities under the Derg grew out of the
country’s long history of violence, imperial or otherwise, outlined in the other contributions
to this collection. These atrocities, however, cannot be adequately understood in purely
endogenous terms. They were underpinned and facilitated by the participation of Ethio-
pians, especially state actors, in global systems of power and of exchange. These included,
butwerenot restricted to, theDerg’s alliancewith socialist bloc governments. That compari-
sons between the Ethiopian Terror andnumerous other cases of sociopolitical upheaval and
state-sponsored atrocity in the twentieth century resonate so stronglydoesnot indicatepar-
allel developments or universal processes of social change and state-building. Rather, it
reflects a common entanglement in shared global histories.58
The language of “Red Terror” itself drew on a pedigree that included, beyond its eight-
eenth-century French precedent, other twentieth century socialist revolutions, most
notably that of Russia in 1917. In Ethiopia, as elsewhere, this language was leveraged
to legitimate and glorify extrajudicial violence, depicted as a revolutionary necessity. As
a spokesman of the Derg commented bluntly in response to criticism of the regime’s
human rights violations: “if they say we do not have to kill people, are they not saying
we have to quit the revolution? The cry to stop the killing is a bourgeois cry.”59 The
reach of this shared transnational register is reflected in the reaction of Soviet professors
at Addis Ababa University, who were delighted to witness in Ethiopia the revolution they
had been too young to experience in Russia. They saw in the Red Terror not only a clear
parallel to its Russian precedent but also the hallmark of a true revolution.60 Their assess-
ment of Ethiopia’s violence was shaped by the circulation of the same ideas, texts and nar-
ratives that had led Ethiopian intellectuals to enthusiastically advocate for armed struggle.
Engagement with ideological registers shared across diverse societies went hand in
hand with participation in global flows of expertise, hardware, and finance. Here, it was
not only the system of global socialist networks that shaped Ethiopia’s internal violence
under the Derg: over the preceding decades, the country had increasingly opened up to
capitalist investment, and, at the level of the state, developed corresponding alliances
that withered only very gradually after the revolution of 1974. The US did not end its mili-
tary support for Ethiopia until early 1977, when the military station it had maintained at
Kagnew in Eritrea lost its strategic significance. Citing the country’s atrocious human
rights record offered a “convenient and low-cost” exit strategy.61 Several counter-insur-
gency and interrogation practices employed under the Derg may be traced back to train-
ing provided by western allies in the late imperial era.62
58 Conrad, What Is Global History?
59 Dadimos Haile, Accountability for Crimes of the Past and the Challenges of Criminal Procecutions: The Case of Ethiopia
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000), 13.
60 Katz, “Children’s Revolution: A Bloodbath in Ethiopia,” 8–9.
61 Embassy Report from Washington, D.C., TNA FCO 31/2080-72, 23 March 1977.
62 Thomas P Ofcansky and LaVerle Bennette Berry, “Ethiopia: A Country Study” (1993), 301; Norman J Singer, “Ethiopia:
Human Rights, 1948-1978,” (paper presented at the proceeding of the first international conference on ethiopian
studies, 1978), 670.
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The Derg’s pivot to the East built on and expanded such partnerships: Soviet and Cuban
support handed Ethiopia a decisive victory over Somalia in the Ogaden. Soviet military and
economic aid underpinned the Derg’s military power and counter-insurgency measures.
And Ethiopian intelligence services built close alliances with several socialist bloc counter-
parts, including the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bul-
garia.63 If these allies were often not sanguine about the international visibility of the
Derg’s domestic repression, they nonetheless tolerated it and made it possible, both mate-
rially and by shielding the Ethiopian regime geopolitically. The form, the rhetoric, the scale,
and the persistence of state-sanctioned violence under the Derg would be incomprehen-
sible apart from these global entanglements. Ethiopia’s participation in international and
transnational networks of ideological and material ambition and exchange underlines the
importance of drawing the country’s historiography deeper into comparative and global
discussions, not least about causes and dynamics of state violence.
Conclusions: Emerging Research Agendas and the Content of
Memorialisation
This essay has argued that there is much to be gained by bringing the historiography of
revolutionary Ethiopia into closer conversation with the field of genocide studies. Such an
integration holds much promise for cross-fertilization, as the preceding sections have
sought to illustrate. For Ethiopian historiography, closer participation in comparative dis-
cussions about mass violence also raises fresh questions and perspectives, and thereby
generates new research agendas. Beyond the aforementioned need to develop a more
global vantage point, two such inquiries appear particularly urgent.
The first concerns the role of rape and sexual violence as acts of genocide and as a mili-
tary strategy in conflicts. Much light has been shed on this subject by studies focused on
other atrocities, notably in Rwanda.64 Documented mass rapes during the recent war in
Tigray have brought the issue of systematic sexual violence in Ethiopian conflicts to
global attention. Yet there is nothing new about such violence. While its occurrence in
a wide range of atrocities, including the Red Terror, is widely noted by witnesses, the
subject remains poorly documented and insufficiently understood.65
A second discussion among genocide scholars that carries obvious significance for
Ethiopian Studies, and to which Ethiopian historiography might have much to contribute,
concerns the question of continuities between imperial violence and later atrocities in the
metropole. The extent to which the Nazi Holocaust drew on colonial-era violence remains
subject to heated debate.66 Yet there is no doubt that the question is an important one for
63 Yordanov, The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa During the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism; Wiebel and
Admasie, “Rethinking the Ethiopian Red Terror,” 473.
64 Binaifer Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath (Human Rights
Watch, 1996); Lisa Sharlach, “Gender and Genocide in Rwanda: Women as Agents and Objects of Genocide,”
Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 3 (1999): 387–99; Adam Jones, “Gender and Genocide in Rwanda,” Journal of Gen-
ocide Research 4, no. 1 (2002): 65-94; Sherrie L Russell-Brown, “Rape as an Act of Genocide,” Berkeley Journal of Inter-
national Law 21 (2003): 350–74; Christopher W Mullins, “‘He Would Kill Me with His Penis’ Genocidal Rape in Rwanda as
a State Crime,” Critical Criminology 17, no. 1 (2009): 15–33.
65 Most of my informants in oral interviews noted that sexual violence was a regular occurrence at their detention sites
during the Red Terror. See also Teffera, Tower in the Sky; Abbink, “The Impact of Violence.”
66 See e.g. Jürgen Zimmerer, “Colonialism and the Holocaust–Towards an Archeology of Genocide,” Development Dialo-
gue 50 (2007): 95–123.
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Ethiopian historiography: to what extent were atrocities against citizens at Ethiopia’s pol-
itical “core” founded on earlier imperial violence against new subjects in the Empire’s
“periphery”? Apparent continuities in the forms of violence employed – including the
public display of bodies that became infamous in the Red Terror – and in the rhetoric
of political exclusion suggest an important line of inquiry.
If there is much potential for the integration of Ethiopian historiography and genocide
studies to yield cross-fertilizing insights, the resultant work might also benefit memoria-
lization efforts in the country. Monuments that preserve the memory of revolutionary
Ethiopia’s atrocities and victims have drawn heavily on the language, material culture
and symbolism of genocide memorialization elsewhere.67 Among such appropriations
is the common slogan of “never again” (mechem endaydegm), intended to distil the
moral lessons of genocide studies into two words pregnant with meaning. Yet persistent
state violence and recent conflicts have emphasized the need to explicate this meaning,
and particularly to refocus attention on the conditions as well as the outcomes of past
atrocities. The conditions for the Red Terror outlined in this essay – the depersonalization
of political opponents, the instrumentalization of an “atrocity environment,” and the cre-
ation of minimally accountable violence-facilitating organizational structures – are all
unspoken at public memorial sites and remain operative in national and global politics.
There is much to be gained by developing and leveraging comparative approaches to
atrocities in the Ethiopian past.
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